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dc.contributor.authorBorchers, Patrick J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-21T18:53:20Z
dc.date.available2017-06-21T18:53:20Z
dc.date.issued1990en_US
dc.identifier.citationPatrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990), reprinted in 1 JURISDICTION AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (Patrick J. Borchers ed., 2014), and reprinted in part in CIVIL PROCEDURE ANTHOLOGY 69 (David I. Levine, Donald L. Doernberg & Melissa L. Nelkin eds., 1998).en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10504/113418
dc.description.abstractIn 1990, in Burnham v. Superior Court, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the traditional rule that a civil defendant could be subjected to personal jurisdiction in a state simply by being physically served with the summons while in the state, no matter how brief or casual the defendant's presence. The validity of this tag rule of jurisdiction had been assumed to be in jeopardy as a result of the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Shaffer v. Heitner which stated in dictum that it was unconstitutional for a state to exercise jurisdiction over any defendant lacking minimum contacts with the state. The Burnham Court, however, could not agree on a rationale. Four justices essentially rejected Shaffer and concluded that the historical pedigree of the tag rule immunized it from constitutional scrutiny. Four others accepted the Shaffer rationale but applied a watered-down version of the minimum contacts test. Justice Stevens in his lone opinion apparently agreed with both rationales. Burnham lays bare the confused origins of the notion that issues of state-court jurisdiction are a matter of constitutional significance. This article argues that this confusion stems from the highly ambiguous 1877 opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff. While Pennoyer seemingly introduced the notion that the Due Process Clause limited state court jurisdiction, plausibly the opinion meant only that due process principles guarantee a defendant an opportunity to challenge jurisdiction. This shaky foundation has led to a confused Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area. The article argues that the Supreme Court should dramatically limit the doctrine and invalidate only those attempted exercises of jurisdiction that put the defendant at a practical disadvantage.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 1990 Patrick J. Borchersen_US
dc.titleDeath of the constitutional law of personal jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and back againen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright (c) 1990 Patrick J. Borchersen_US
dc.description.volume24en_US
dc.title.workU.C. Davis Law Reviewen_US
dc.description.noteBorchers_24UCDavisLRev19.pdfen_US
dc.description.pages19-105en_US
dc.subject.fastDue process of lawen_US
dc.subject.fastJurisdictionen_US
dc.subject.fastCivil procedureen_US
dc.url.fasthttp://id.worldcat.org/fast/899343en_US
dc.url.fasthttp://id.worldcat.org/fast/985026en_US
dc.url.fasthttp://id.worldcat.org/fast/862585en_US
dc.date.year1990en_US
dc.date.monthFallen_US
dc.description.issue1en_US
dc.program.unitSchool of Lawen_US
dc.url.link3http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982924en_US
dc.url.link1https://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/davlr24&collection=journals&id=31en_US
dc.contributor.cuauthorBorchers, Patrick J.en_US
dc.identifier.viafhttp://viaf.org/viaf/165068140en_US
dc.identifier.isnihttp://isni.org/isni/000000011720119X
dc.identifier.wcihttp://www.worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n96029505/en_US
dc.identifier.ssrnhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=378743en_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6187-7522


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